[Colloquium] TTIC Colloquium: Azarakhsh Malekian, Northwestern University

[Julia MacGlashan]

*REMINDER*

When:             *Monday, Oct 11 @ 1:00pm*

Where:           * TTIC Conference Room #526*, 6045 S Kenwood Ave, 5th Floor

Who:              * Azarakhsh Malekian*, Northwestern University

Title:               * Reducing baysian mechanism design to algorithm design
*

We give a simple reduction that transforms any algorithm into a Bayesian
incentive-compatible mechanism. The reduction preserves social welfare up to
an additive loss that can be made arbitrarily small in polynomial time in
the input size. Our reduction is applicable even in settings where the
agents’ types are multi-dimensional, provided that the type distributions
are specified in one of the following ways: either the input specifies every
type vector in the support of each agent’s type distribution along with its
associated probability, or we are provided with the ability to randomly
sample from each agent’s type distribution as well as the ability to
evaluate the conditional expectation of any agent’s utility given a fixed
type vector in the support of its distribution.

This is a joint work with Jason Hartline and Robert Kleinberg.

Bio: Azarakhsh is a postdoctoral fellow at the theory group at the computer
science department, northwestern university. She received her B.Sc. in
Computer Science from Sharif Institute of Technology and  her PhD. from
University of Maryland in 2009.  Her current research interests include
algorithmic game theory/Mechanism design and its application to sponsored
search auctions.

Host:              Yury Makarychev, yury at ttic.edu
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