[Theory] TODAY! 3/22 TTIC Colloquium: Eva Tardos, Cornell University

[Mary Marre]

*When:*         Friday, March 22, 2024 at* 2:00** pm** CT   *


*Where:       *Talk will be given *live, in-person* at

                   TTIC, 6045 S. Kenwood Avenue

                   5th Floor, Room 530


*Virtually:*   *via panopto: **livestream*
<https://uchicago.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=a52ebc6e-03e0-452a-94c9-b13a0144aa4d>



*Who: *         Eva Tardos, Cornell University
------------------------------
*Title:*          Stability and Learning in Strategic Games



*Abstract:* Over the last two decades we have developed good understanding
how to quantify the impact of strategic user behavior on outcomes in many
games (including traffic routing and online auctions) and showed that the
resulting bounds extend to repeated games assuming players use a form of
learning (no-regret learning) to adapt to the environment. We will review
how this area evolved since its early days, and also discuss some of the
new frontiers, including when repeated interactions have carry-over effects
between rounds: when outcomes in one round effect the game in the future,
as is the case in many applications.



In this talk, we study this phenomenon in the context of a game modeling
queuing systems: routers compete for servers, where packets that do not get
served need to be resent, resulting in a system where the number of packets
at each round depends on the success of the routers in the previous rounds.
In joint work with Jason Gaitonde, we analyze the resulting highly
dependent random processes, and show bounds on the resulting budgeted
welfare for auctions and the excess server capacity needed to guarantee
that all packets get served in the queuing system despite the selfish
(myopic) behavior of the participants. We will briefly mention work with
Giannis Fikioris in a different game, repeated auction with budgets, where
the same issue arises also.


*Bio: *Éva Tardos is the Jacob Gould Schurman Professor and Department
Chair of the Department of Computer Science at Cornell University.  Her
research interests are in Algorithms, Algorithmic Game Theory, and
Networks.  She has been elected to the National Academy of Engineering,
National Academy of Sciences, and the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, is an external member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and
is the recipient of a number of fellowships and awards including the the
IEEE John von Neumann Medal, Packard Fellowship, the Gödel Prize, Dantzig
Prize, and the Fulkerson Prize.


*Host: **Avrim Blum* <avrim at ttic.edu>

*Access to this livestream is limited to TTIC / UChicago (press panopto
link and sign in to your UChicago account with CNetID).



Mary C. Marre
Faculty Administrative Support
*Toyota Technological Institute*
*6045 S. Kenwood Avenue, Rm 517*
*Chicago, IL  60637*
*773-834-1757*
*mmarre at ttic.edu <mmarre at ttic.edu>*


On Thu, Mar 21, 2024 at 3:06 PM Mary Marre <mmarre at ttic.edu> wrote:

> *When:*         Friday, March 22, 2024 at* 2:00** pm** CT   *
>
>
> *Where:       *Talk will be given *live, in-person* at
>
>                    TTIC, 6045 S. Kenwood Avenue
>
>                    5th Floor, Room 530
>
>
> *Virtually:*   *via panopto: **livestream*
> <https://uchicago.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=a52ebc6e-03e0-452a-94c9-b13a0144aa4d>
>
>
>
> *Who: *         Eva Tardos, Cornell University
> ------------------------------
> *Title:*          Stability and Learning in Strategic Games
>
>
>
> *Abstract:* Over the last two decades we have developed good
> understanding how to quantify the impact of strategic user behavior on
> outcomes in many games (including traffic routing and online auctions) and
> showed that the resulting bounds extend to repeated games assuming players
> use a form of learning (no-regret learning) to adapt to the environment. We
> will review how this area evolved since its early days, and also discuss
> some of the new frontiers, including when repeated interactions have
> carry-over effects between rounds: when outcomes in one round effect the
> game in the future, as is the case in many applications.
>
>
>
> In this talk, we study this phenomenon in the context of a game modeling
> queuing systems: routers compete for servers, where packets that do not get
> served need to be resent, resulting in a system where the number of packets
> at each round depends on the success of the routers in the previous rounds.
> In joint work with Jason Gaitonde, we analyze the resulting highly
> dependent random processes, and show bounds on the resulting budgeted
> welfare for auctions and the excess server capacity needed to guarantee
> that all packets get served in the queuing system despite the selfish
> (myopic) behavior of the participants. We will briefly mention work with
> Giannis Fikioris in a different game, repeated auction with budgets, where
> the same issue arises also.
>
>
> *Bio: *Éva Tardos is the Jacob Gould Schurman Professor and Department
> Chair of the Department of Computer Science at Cornell University.  Her
> research interests are in Algorithms, Algorithmic Game Theory, and
> Networks.  She has been elected to the National Academy of Engineering,
> National Academy of Sciences, and the American Academy of Arts and
> Sciences, is an external member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and
> is the recipient of a number of fellowships and awards including the the
> IEEE John von Neumann Medal, Packard Fellowship, the Gödel Prize, Dantzig
> Prize, and the Fulkerson Prize.
>
>
> *Host: **Avrim Blum* <avrim at ttic.edu>
>
> *Access to this livestream is limited to TTIC / UChicago (press panopto
> link and sign in to your UChicago account with CNetID).
>
>
>
> Mary C. Marre
> Faculty Administrative Support
> *Toyota Technological Institute*
> *6045 S. Kenwood Avenue, Rm 517*
> *Chicago, IL  60637*
> *773-834-1757*
> *mmarre at ttic.edu <mmarre at ttic.edu>*
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mailman.cs.uchicago.edu/pipermail/theory/attachments/20240322/e3f85961/attachment-0001.html>