[Theory] Fwd: CS+Econ Quarterly Workshop: Mechanism Design with Non-linear Utility

[Avrim Blum]

FYI: CS+Econ workshop at Northwestern on May 24:
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Jason Hartline <hartline at eecs.northwestern.edu>
Date: Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 5:46 PM
Subject: CS+Econ Quarterly Workshop: Mechanism Design with Non-linear
Utility
To: Avrim Blum <avrim at ttic.edu>


Hi Avrim,

Here is an announcement for the Spring CS+Econ Quarterly Workshop.  Please
share!  (And I hope you can make it!)  BTW.  There should be a QTW
happening around that date as well, an announcement should come soon.

Jason

==================================================

Northwestern CS+Econ Quarterly Workshop
Mechanism Design with Non-linear Utility
Kellogg Global Hub 5101, Northwestern U, 2211 Campus Dr, Evanston, IL 60208.
9:00am-12:35pm, Friday, May 24, 2019
https://sites.northwestern.edu/csecon/events/mechanism-design-with-non-linear-utility/

==================================================


About the Series

The Quarterly CS+Econ Workshop brings in three or four experts at the
interface between computer science and economics to present their
perspective and research on a common theme. Chicago area researchers with
interest in theoretical computer science are invited to attend. The
technical program is in the morning and includes coffee and lunch. The
afternoon of the workshop will allow for continued discussion between
attendees and the speakers.

The the workshop series is organized by Ronen Gradwohl (Kellogg, MEDS),
Jason Hartline (Computer Science), and Marciano Siniscalchi (Economics).
Funding for the series is provided by the Shaw Family Supporting
Organization CS+X Fund.


Synopsis

The second edition of this workshop will be on the theme of Mechanism
Design for Non-linear Utility. Much of the literature on mechanism design
focuses on settings where agents have quasi-linear utilities where there
are elegant closed-form characterizations of optimal mechanisms. In more
general settings where agents have non-linear utility, crisp closed-form
characterizations are few and far between. This workshop aims showcases
recent progress in this challenging domain. The speakers are Brian Baisa,
Shuchi Chawla, Kamesh Munagala, and Sergei Severinov.



Logistics

        • Date: Friday, May 24, 2019.
        • Location: Kellogg Global Hub 5101 (map), Northwestern U,
Evanston, IL 60208.
        • Transit: Noyes St. Purple Line (map).
        • Parking: Validation for North Campus Parking Garage (map)
available at workshop.
        • Registration: None required.  Please bring your own name badge
from past conference.


Schedule

        • 8:30-9:00: Continental Breakfast
        • 9:00-9:05: Opening Remarks
        • 9:05-9:45: Sergei Severinov (UBC):
Optimal and Efficient Mechanisms with Asymmetrically Budget Constrained
Buyers
        • 9:45-9:50: Sergei Severinov Q/A
        • 9:50-10:30: Kamesh Munagala (Duke U):
A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer
        • 10:30-10:35: Kamesh Munagala Q/A
        • 10:35-11:05: Coffee Break
        • 11:05-11:45: Brian Baisa (Amherst):
Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods
        • 11:45-11:50: Brian Baisa Q/A
        • 11:50-12:30: Shuchi Chawla (UW-Madison):
Revenue maximization with an uncertainty-averse buyer
        • 12:30-12:35: Shuchi Chawla Q/A
        • 12:35-1:30: Lunch


Titles and Abstracts

Speaker: Sergei Severinov
Title: Optimal and Efficient Mechanisms with Asymmetrically Budget
Constrained Buyers
Abstract: The paper characterizes both the optimal (revenue-maximizing) and
constrained-efficient (surplus maximizing) mechanisms for allocating a good
to buyers who face asymmetric budget constraints. Both the optimal and
efficient mechanisms belong to one of two classes. When the budget
differences between the buyers are small, the mechanism discriminates only
between high-valuation types for whom the budget constraint is binding. All
low valuations buyers are treated symmetrically despite budget differences.
When budget differences are sufficiently large, the mechanism discriminates
in favor of buyers with small budgets when the valuations are low, and in
favor of buyers with larger budgets when the valuations are high

Joint work with Alexei Boulatov.

Speaker: Kamesh Munagala
Title: A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer
Abstract: We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting for an
additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist
seller with m heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to
maximize her revenue. The buyer has a budget and additive valuations drawn
independently for each item from (non-identical) distributions. We show
that when the buyer’s budget is publicly known, the better of selling each
item separately and selling the grand bundle extracts a constant fraction
of the optimal revenue. When the budget is private, we consider a standard
Bayesian setting where buyer’s budget b is drawn from a known distribution
B. We show that if b is independent of the valuations and distribution B
satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, then selling items separately
or in a grand bundle is still approximately optimal. We give a
complementary example showing that no constant approximation simple
mechanism is possible if budget b can be interdependent with valuations.

Joint work with Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin, and Kangning Wang.

Speaker: Brian Baisa
Title: Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods
Abstract: I study multi-unit auction design when bidders have private
values, multi-unit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. I give
conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey
auction’s desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual
rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto
efficiency. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired
incentive and efficiency properties. Instead of assuming that bidders have
quasilinear preferences, I assume that bidders have positive wealth
effects. My model nests cases where bidders are risk averse, face financial
constraints, or have budgets.

With two bidders, I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desired
properties of the Vickrey auction if bidders have single-dimensional types.
I present an impossibility theorem that shows that there is no mechanism
that satisfies Vickrey’s desired properties and weak budget balance when
bidders have multi-dimensional types. I also present a second impossibility
theorem for the case where there are three or more bidders, even if bidders
have single-dimensional types.

Speaker: Shuchi Chawla
Title: Revenue maximization with an uncertainty-averse buyer
Abstract: Most work in mechanism design assumes that buyers are risk
neutral; some considers risk aversion arising due to a non-linear utility
for money. Yet behavioral studies have established that real agents exhibit
risk attitudes which cannot be captured by any expected utility model. We
initiate the study of revenue-optimal mechanisms under buyer behavioral
models beyond expected utility theory. We adopt a model from prospect
theory which arose to explain these discrepancies and incorporates agents
under-weighting uncertain outcomes. In our model, an event occurring with
probability x<1 is worth strictly less to the agent than x times the value
of the event when it occurs with certainty. In contrast to the risk-neutral
setting, the optimal mechanism may be randomized and appears challenging to
find, even for a single buyer and a single item for sale. Nevertheless, we
give a characterization of the optimal mechanism which enables positive
approximation results. In particular, we show that under a reasonable
bounded-risk-aversion assumption, posted pricing obtains a constant
approximation.

Joint work with Kira Goldner, Benjamin Miller, and Emmanouil Pountourakis.
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