[Colloquium] Reminder - Troy Hu MS Presentation/May 29, 2020

[Jessica Garza]

This is an announcement of Troy Hu's MS Presentation. Troy is a student in the Bx/MS program.

Here is the Zoom link to participate:
https://uchicagostudents.zoom.us/j/97220161180 <https://uchicagostudents.zoom.us/j/97220161180>

Meeting ID: 972 2016 1180
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Meeting ID: 972 2016 1180
Find your local number: https://uchicagostudents.zoom.us/u/adbl4QGz6c <https://uchicagostudents.zoom.us/u/adbl4QGz6c>

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Date:  Friday, May 29, 2020

Time:  10:00 AM, Central Time

Place:  remote via Zoom

M.S. Candidate:  Troy Hu

M.S. Paper Title: Automated Localization of Timing-Related Security Bugs in Hardware Designs

Abstract:

Hardware systems today are largely at risk of leaking sensitive data through timing variations in low-level operations, which leads to severe consequences such as confidentiality breaches and malicious actors gaining root privileges. For example, the famous Spectre and Meltdown attacks on modern processors are possible partly due to timing variations in the caches. In order to ensure timing secure designs, hardware designers must be provided with the necessary tools to detect and localize the bugs. While there exist techniques that can detect timing-related security bugs, e.g. Information Flow Tracking (IFT), bug localization is primarily performed through manual efforts, which are time-consuming and inefficient. In this talk, we present a novel and elegant ​technique​ that can be utilized to automatically localize timing-related security bugs in hardware designs by leveraging existing IFT infrastructure with low cost and high precision. We demonstrate the efficacy of this technique by applying it to a wide variety of hardware designs. Moreover, based on the insights gained from our results, we identify exciting directions for future work in security bug localization. 

Troy's Advisor: Professor Yanjing Li



Jessica Garza
Assistant Director of Undergraduate Studies
Department of Computer Science
The University of Chicago
Covid-19 Resources <https://cs.uchicago.edu/remote2020/>
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