[Colloquium] 2/18 Talks at TTIC: Alon Eden, Tel Aviv University

Mary Marre via Colloquium colloquium at mailman.cs.uchicago.edu
Tue Feb 12 12:46:17 CST 2019


When:     Monday, February 18th at *11:00 am*

Where:    TTIC, 6045 S Kenwood Avenue, 5th Floor, Room 526

Who:       Alon Eden, Tel Aviv University*T**itle:     *Auction Design with
Interdependent Values

*Abstract:* Algorithms used in the context of strategic agents are known as
Mechanisms. Mechanism design has been studied for years but many positive
results require strong assumptions such as hyperrationality of the
participants, simultaneous events, known priors, etc. Contrawise, negative
results lump together many scenarios and are not informative. In this talk
I will discuss more robust mechanisms - removing unreasonable assumptions
when possible and doing a fine grained analysis of the ‘bad’ cases. As a
case study, I will present results on auction design with correlated
valuations.


*Host:*  Yury Makarychev <yury at ttic.edu>



Mary C. Marre
Administrative Assistant
*Toyota Technological Institute*
*6045 S. Kenwood Avenue*
*Room 517*
*Chicago, IL  60637*
*p:(773) 834-1757*
*f: (773) 357-6970*
*mmarre at ttic.edu <mmarre at ttic.edu>*


On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 3:31 PM Mary Marre <mmarre at ttic.edu> wrote:

> When:     Thursday, January 31st at *11:00 am*
>
> Where:    TTIC, 6045 S Kenwood Avenue, 5th Floor, Room 526
>
> Who:       Alon Eden, Tel Aviv University*T**itle:     *Auction Design
> with Interdependent Values
>
> *Abstract:* Algorithms used in the context of strategic agents are known
> as Mechanisms. Mechanism design has been studied for years but many
> positive results require strong assumptions such as hyperrationality of the
> participants, simultaneous events, known priors, etc. Contrawise, negative
> results lump together many scenarios and are not informative. In this talk
> I will discuss more robust mechanisms - removing unreasonable assumptions
> when possible and doing a fine grained analysis of the ‘bad’ cases. As a
> case study, I will present results on auction design with correlated
> valuations.
>
>
> *Host:*  Yury Makarychev <yury at ttic.edu>
>
>
>
>
>
> Mary C. Marre
> Administrative Assistant
> *Toyota Technological Institute*
> *6045 S. Kenwood Avenue*
> *Room 517*
> *Chicago, IL  60637*
> *p:(773) 834-1757*
> *f: (773) 357-6970*
> *mmarre at ttic.edu <mmarre at ttic.edu>*
>
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