[Colloquium] TTI-C Guest Speaker @ Ryerson Today (3/16/06)

[Katherine Cumming]

**********TTI-C Guest Speaker Today***********
                              March 16, 2006
        Presented by:  Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago
 
 
Speaker:  Silvio Micali, MIT CSAIL
Speaker's home page:
<http://www.csail.mit.edu/biographies/PI/bioprint.php?PeopleID=36>
http://www.csail.mit.edu/biographies/PI/bioprint.php?PeopleID=36
 
 
Date: Thursday, March 16, 2006 
Location:  Ryerson 251, Part of TTI-C Distinguished Lecturer Series
Time:  3:00 pm
 
Title:   Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design
 
Abstract: 
We prove a general result bridging the fields of Secure Protocols and Game
Theory.

In game-theoretic terms, we show that ANY mediated game with incomplete
information can be perfectly simulated by the players alone, by means of an
extensive-form game in which the trusted mediator is replaced by a ballot
box---the venerable device used throughout the world to privately and
correctly compute the tally of secret votes. 

In cryptographic terms, we show that, in ANY joint computation, security can
be achieved based solely on the players' RATIONALITY, rather than on the
HONESTY of some of them. 

Our result has broad implications for Mechanism Design; in particular, it
enables One to design mechanisms in a MODULAR and COMPETITIVE fashion. 

Joint work with Sergei Izmalkov and Matt Lepinski 
 
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If you have questions, or would like to meet the speaker, please contact
Katherine at 773-834-1994 or kcumming at tti-c.org.   
For information on future TTI-C talks and events, please go to the TTI-C
Events page:  http://www.tti-c.org/events.html.  TTI-C (1427 East 60th
Street, Chicago, IL  60637)
 
 
 
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